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nft_legal_and_ma_ket_challenges_in_pe_missioned_blockchain_netwo_ks [Computer Graphics 2011]

NFT Legal and Market Challenges in Permissioned Blockchain Networks. This work analyses the distributed-ledger technology as a digital framework for the representation and exercise of tokenized rights, as well as the private-law characterization and EU regimen applicable to non-fungible tokens (NFTs). After a brief introduction to permissioning in blockchain and to permissioned distributed ledgers (PDLs), we reflect on its relevance to NFT contracting and markets, focusing on the legal and cryptocurrency economic consequences of NFT trading in PDLs, with particular emphasis on public permissioned networks (PPDLs). We then discuss key challenges about law-compliant trading for NFTs, such as proper legal qualification of their nature, determination of optimal conditions for the legal trading of NFT underlying assets and investing applicable regime, including specific primary-market and essential public surveillance and intellectual-property (IP) issues. Keywords. permissioned blockchain networks non-fungible tokens public-permissioned DLT networks primary-market obligations IP protection. Author Information. Javier Ibáñez Jiménez. Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Spain. Eva María Ibáñez Jiménez * Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED), Spain. *Address all correspondence to: eibanez@cee.uned.es. 1. Introduction. Distributed-ledger techonology (hereinafter, DLT, mostly known in its blockchain version or variant) and tokenization as a device to incorporate and exchange data (in the so called DLT tokens) are jointly considered within a market public- and private-law and also within a contractual legal and economic context, an efficient way to obtain the valid representation of credit rights arisen from contracts. Such credits are enforceable in courts against the issuer of the token or person on behalf of whom such issuer acts. Eventually, DLT tokens can validly represent in rem , rights in favor of the token holder. Transmission of the rights represented and possibly incorporated to the token, after the issuance and legal configuration of such rights in accordance with an off-chain contract (ordinarily under initial coin or token offering -ICO/ITO- regulation) between token issuer/offeror and accepting investors, documented in an informative whitepaper similar to the initial public offering prospectus. Exercise of such rights and fulfillment of the corresponding obligations, as the token holder is entitled to claim the contents of the represented rights against the issuer or linked third party. During the issuance of the tokens, the phenomenon of tokenization technically occurs. It can consist either in the creation of virtual assets (connected or not to a metaverse of investors, as is typical of NFTs) or in the representation of preexisting rights, which have arisen from the celebration of an investment contract, a service or purchase agreement, a specific non-investment contract celebrated to grant tokenized or digitally represented rights between the issuer or creator of such rights and token buyers; or between a generator or creator of tokens other than a financial issuer or financed subject (legal person within the context of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Markets in Crypto-assets, and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 -Brussels 24.9.2020, COM(2020) 593 final, 2020/0265 (COD); hereinafter, MiCA). A previous contract between platform manager and issuer is necessary in order to operate under DLT and decentralized financial (DeFi) platform. Such a contract is complementary and additional to the previous contract between the financial issuer and the investing public or interested in receiving tokenized services or products. Substantial reduction of issuance and other transaction costs of the issuer (ITO structuring, fees in auxiliary management contracts, global coordination, guarantee, . ), many of them minimal or unnecessary in DLT due to decentralization and suppression of intermediaries. And a parallel reduction of investor costs, particularly commission fees present in the traditional financial intermediation. Significant increase in the speed of market transactions related to the transfer of tokens, with subsequent shortening of contracting terms. This legal and financial characteristic of token transmission entails a huge exceptional competitive advantage both for issuers and specialized operators in a decentralized finance (DeFi) digital environment, namely the marketplaces built on top of a permissioned blockchain, as we will explain later on. Enhanced cybersecurity and privacy of transactions. However, DLT cyber-risks are important and should not be neglected, as organized financial market supervisors continuously warn, without prejudice to the risks associated with deregulation, which the European MiCA Regulation will foreseeably cut down, by disciplining the white paper and the intervention of specialists in tokenized investment services (token platform, crypto exchange, crypto investment advice, market creation, crypto-market making and DLT liquidity, crypto-market orders, and key management and digital wallets, among others; cf. articles 4 to 9 and 67 to 75 MiCA). Generally speaking, tokens or crypto-assets tradable under DLT conditions can contain rights arising from financing contracts (loan and partnership) entered into or arranged prior to the tokenization, and sometimes even before the creation of the DeFi marketplace or DLT platform habilitating DLT-network token contracting services. On some occasions, tokens arise from a network financial agreement, then being called cryptocurrencies by markets in the sense of payment tokens (serving as a means to extinguish debts). In other cases, tokenization comes from a network service contract, or derives from network developments or the provision of services related or not with the blockchain, but anyway under DLT (as in the case of utility tokens, deserving special rules in accordance with EU MiCA regulation). There are also crypto-assets exclusively used as currencies, thus serving as a mechanism for payment and extinction of credits and debts, or as a means of token exchange, also allowing the disinvestment or profit collection by exiting from a tokenized investing position, as in conventional finance. Finally, some tokens are hybrids, participating to varying degrees in the characteristics of payment, utility, and investment tokens; thus, different types of legal businesses can be configured to exchange virtual or real wealth by representation in a decentralized financial system (DeFi). 2. The private-law characterization and EU regime applicable to non-fungible tokens (NFTs) The diversity of imaginable contractual configurations and technical standards apt and suitable for the creation of NFTs -on real assets or intellectual rigths, inter alia- , does not has uniform and consolidated legal boundaries in many jurisdictions yet. Thus, the technical characterization of NFTs as traded assets in markets is possible even if the token represents non-replicable or individually predetermined or preconfigured rights derived from the specificity of the token or from the uniqueness of the represented rights or assets. In the US laws, NFTs are conceived as digital certificates representing ownership of a unique asset, or of other rights created or granted on a unique asset or good, or on contracted services or obligations. A massive negotiation of the token or parts of the represented asset is technically possible, though not always desirable from a private-law policy perspective, or even from the viewpoint of public order or macroeconomics. In order for tokenization to be an efficient way to generate and trade credit rights on the issuer, moreover, it is necessary that the legal regime for tokenized assets adequately protects investors. Otherwise, the NFT token market will lose its still weak legal credibility, on the one hand; and on the other, the decentralized financial (DeFi) market will be affected as a whole to the extent that NFT token markets are linked with the whole DeFi system and all DLT financial markets. Ultimately affecting as well traditional capital markets linked with DeFi by the available mechanisms of digital currencies and associated payment systems (electronic money tokens or EMTs, payments in bitcoin and cryptocurrency other digital assets, and mechanisms for exchanging or exchanging digital money for fiat money). The triple regulation of the European Parliament and Council proposed on 24 of September 2020 (MiCA, operative resilience Act – DORA, and market infrastructure regulation – MIR) composes the so-called European digital finance strategy within the framework of the single digital market. The main regulation is MiCA, concerning crypto-asset markets and token intermediaries to establish efficient market rules and investor-protective new supervisory mechanisms, partly by analogy with respect to the classic protective regulation typical of the MIFIR/MIFID 2 context. On the one hand, financial stability and the defense of European monetary sovereignty, and that of the Member States, mainly translated into the configuration of a special regime for cryptoactives considered stable currencies (stablecoins), either because of their status as tokens equivalent to electronic (e-money tokens, EMTs) or because of their volatility due to their connection with an underlying that is a listed financial or nonfinancial asset or widely traded on the market (asset-reference tokens, ARTs, whose regime of maintenance and deposit and reserve investment or backup by the issuer is very demanding). To this respect, NFT markets are only partially concerned, because NFTs are not conceived as stablecoins since they lack underlying reference, provided that the represented assets are unique in most cases. However, baskets of tokenized assets underlying the NFTs could serve as a reference for specific asset-referenced tokens (ARTs), considered by MiCA as stablecoins, subject to severe specific supervision requirements and governance rules applicable to issuers, including the disposal and control of reserve assets. And on the other hand, the protection of the assets of the issuers themselves and of the investors who operate through specialist market professionals, specifically the new cryptoasset service providers disciplined in the new MiCA regulation from a statutory and contractual point of view. In the case of NFTs, it is to be noted that whenever cryptoassets are “unique” and “non fungible” with respect to other cryptoassets (art. 4.2.c MiCA), rules on whitepaper writing, notification to the national competent market authority, and whitepaper publishing are not applicable to the issuing entity, which could offer them to the public and/or request or apply for quotation or secondary trading in a crypto-asset trading platform with exemption from whitepaper transparency requisites, ex arts. 4.1. b, c, d, MiCA, and corresponding arts. 5, 7 and 8 MiCA). Anyway, public offerings as securities or trading in regulated DeFi of such unique NFTs would be subject to the demanding specifications contained in article 13 (cf. 4.1.d, y v. infra, IVC). Without prejudice to this, NFTs that could be qualified as stablecoins (or fungible tokens derived from NFTs by means of division or fractioning of represented rights on NFTs) would be submitted to severe requisites applicable to ARTs (Title III, Chapter I, arts. 15 et seq MiCA). In the US, securities laws regime may be applicable if the NFTs represent presales of digital assets intended for use on a platform that is not yet built and the proceeds of the sale are used to build the platform (in the EU MiCA regime these tokens should be considered in general as “utility tokens”). And securities regulation is also applicable in cases of “pooling” or “fractionalization” of digital assets by artists or composers who share revenues with investors owning multiple NFTs representing fractional ownership of an asset, or shares of the revenue obtained from the asset (e. g., sale percentages of represented songs or poems). Amendments of the Proposal by EU Parliament written in 19.10.2021 (Nrs. 50 to 52 from Members of the EU Parliament KAILI and LALUCQ, sub MiCA Draft Compromises by MEP Berger , Compromise L) suggest in a new recital (8a) that MiCA Regulation applies only to cryptos “transferable among holders without the issuers’ permission.” Thus, NFTs will be excluded from MiCA if they are “unique and not fungible with other crypto-assets, which are not fractionable and are accepted only by the issuer, including merchant’s loyalty schemes, IP rights, guarantees, certificate of authenticity of a unique physical asset, or any other right not linked to the ones that financial instruments bear and are not accepted to trading at a crypto-asset exchange . ” Thus, securities laws would apply to fractionable NFTs, or to NFTs accepted by other than the issuer, particularly when NFTs encompass rights linked to those born be financial instruments. In the case that such instruments were negotiable in regulated markets, MiFID 2 Directive (2014/65/EU) would apply. As recital (8a) also states, the fractions of an NTF “should not be considered unique and not fungible,” unlike the -multiple and fungible- investment or security tokens ruled by MiFID 2 and related EU Directives (AML, anti-money laundering, 2015/849, and 2014/57) and by Regulations (EU) 2017/1129 on Prospectus and 596/2014 on market abuse. KAILI and LALUCQ believe that “the sole attribution of a unique identifier to a crypto-asset is not sufficient to classify it” as NFT. Anyway, NFTs representing services, digital or physical assets that are unique, indivisible and not fungible (like product guarantees, personalized products or services, or real estate) should not be subject to MiCA, except if the NFT grants to the holder or its issuer “specific rights linked to those of financial instruments, such as profit rights or other entitlements.” The reason is clear: in such case, NFTs have been voluntarily (contractually) converted into securities. Indivisible NFTs solely “accepted by the issuer” (new recital 8c proposed), and not accepted to exchange trading, should be subject to a wide bespoke or tailored regime (agreeing, KAILI and LALUCQ, ibid.). 3. A brief introduction to permissioning in blockchain and to public-permissioned distributed ledgers or networks (PPDLs) and its relevance for NFT contracting and markets. 3.1 The meaning of permissioning in tokenization and the concept of public-permissioning. From a DLT structure or architectural perspective, the tokenization or creation of cryptos or tokens can be materialized according to various complex technical procedures. We herein consider the options actively present in token markets within the context of permissioned DLT networks (with authorization or permission of certain nodes to record transactions or data exchanges in the blockchain and blocks – onchain transactions), as long as they are publicly accessible and allow anyone to perform operations. Node or nodal requirements for a network member to be approved as capable to validate the recorded transactions, and to be eligible to effectively record them on the ever growing block-chain as a part of the information tied to the ledger, which plays a key role as a practically immutable or indelible and unforgeable data registry. PDLs are governed or administered by permissioned or authorized nodes in accordance with the bylaws or previous contracts governing the network and the competences of nodes (“miners” in permission-less ledgers). Public accessibility to the information recorded in the distributed ledger. Permissioned transactions (corresponding to PDL data traffic) are not publicly accessible or readable without authorization granted by ledger administrators who may require self-identification through certificates or other digital means. Permissionless ledgers like Bitcoin have received most attention from the markets since 2015, but tokens (including NFT) should be traded only in PDLs, better qualified to address most of the legal requirements posed by token use cases in the DeFi industry from the viewpoint of legislators and governmental financial institutions. The former affirmation rests on both technical and legal reasons, and also in economic considerations. Total anonymity and decentralization characterizing Bitcoin does not match legal requirements of control and supervision essential to protect DeFi markets and investors. Otherwise, transaction costs and “proof-of-work” classical requirements to tie blocks and computational effort (including electrical consumption) to find out nonce numbers (it takes roughly ten minutes for a miner to sign a Bitcoin block, and fractions of seconds to sign a PDL block) render permissionless costly, environmentally unsustainable and undesirable for token trading and related contract negotiation and execution. Apart from fastness and computational dramatic cost reduction, other technical aspects favor PDLs as the natural site for optimal token contracting, like the possibility of further control of recorded transaction, the supervision of functioning and cost of the consensus algorithm, and many options to adopt and adapt adequate fairness properties among participants. The legal matters include the support from external legal agreements or the regulatory enforcement in critical financial subsectors like NFT contracting. The terminology varies from the general perspective of the International Standards Organization (ISO), whose standards recognize the concept of public ledgers in several standards, to the most specific viewpoint of, among others, the specific standards of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU-T) and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). Those institutions consider that PDLs are “trusted” blockchain, whose domain is defined by compliance and interoperability (cf. https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gr/PDL/001_099/001/01.01.01_60/gr_PDL001v01010 1p.pdf, 1 et seq.) and the corresponding definitions contained in the ISO/DIS 22739 Terminology, ISO/CD 23257.2 Reference architecture set by the Blockchain Technical Committee ISO TC 307. It should be noted that CEN-CENELEC: CEN (European Committee for Standardization) and CENELEC (European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization) have stable liaisons with ETSI ISG PDL; and a new Technical Committee acts as mirror with ISO/TC 307. This Focus Group decided to continue as a Joint Technical Committee (CEN/CLC JTC19) since 2019. On the public nature of a blockchain, see the standards of ITU-T FG DLT, Technical Specifications and Technical Reports D1.1, D3.1 and D3.3; cf. ETSI GS PDL-012, developing a layered PDL reference architecture; ETSI GR PDL 003 V1.1.1 (2020-12); Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Application Scenarios, http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gr/PDL/ 001_099/003/01.01.01_60 /gr_PDL003v010101p.pdf; ETSI GR PDL 004 V1.1.1 (2021-02); Permissioned Distributed Ledgers (PDL); Smart Contracts; System Architecture and Functional Specification, http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gr/PDL/001_099/004/ 01.01.01_60/ gr_ PDL 004v010101p.pdf. The aforementioned standards have become crucial to understand the meaning and scope of permissioning and the possibilities of authorization granted by nodes to DeFi platform managers, intermediaries and NFT investors, as we will show below (section 3.2) since the conditions of legally recognizable markets depend on the technical characterization and structure of permissions granted by and to operating nodes in the network. It is to be well noted, finally, that in order for a token market to be successfully deployed with full compliance control capacity by market authorities, the optimal solution seems to combine the advantages of permissioning under proof of authority (PoA) protocols and the publicness or public nature of the network, meaning public access to operate and openness for the public control of nodal activity, and therefore, decentralized control of the network, which is not possessed or dominated by a single entity. The standards of the International Telecommunications Union outline the distinction between public and private blockchains; for cryptocurrency instance, in ITU-T Focus Group DLT Technical Specifications and Technical Reports of 2019, namely D1.1, D3.1 ,and D3.3. The European Telecommunications Standards Institute develops a layered architecture in documents like ETSI GS PDL-012 and ETSI GR PDL 003 V1.1.1 (2020-12), and a concept of PDL in several key documents like [1]. The concept of public-permissioned network as a distributed ledger (PPDL) has been introduced in the Ethereum blockchain practice by Consorcio Red Alastria, the generator of the first worldwide essay or alpha version of a PPDL, encompassing ETSI PDL standards and functioning philosophy recently detailed [2], situating the governance and access control in the Platform Service Layer within the PDL network architecture. 3.2 Significance of authority proofing in PDLs for token contracts. In the case of PDLs based on the Ethereum blockchain protocol, transactions are developed applying IBFT or Byzantine-type consensus protocols to grant permission to record transactions on blocks, under a DLT network system configuration where different alternative tests or validation protocols can coexist (e.g., specific test of permission or authorization by validator nodes, known as Proof of Authority or PoA [3]). For the proper execution of such protocols and the deployment of smart contracts to automate the fulfilment of programmed transactions related to payment and transmission of tokens, and other effects linked to their normalized trading on exchange platforms (and their corresponding asset and benefit transference among node addresses), the developers of Ethereum have devised different standards, called Ethereum Request for Comments, ERCs, which entail substantially different characteristics, serving to carry out transactions a variety of tokens. Derived from Proof of Stake (PoS) and in the Ethereum 2.0 blockchain (today ready for the mining of more than 100k transactions per second, thanks to new shards or channels for massive-data distribution, which guarantee the scalability of the network), the PoA protocol aims to keep the strengths of PoS (financial incentive for validators, limited computational effort and hardware sophistication; sharding scalability) overcoming its drawbacks, mainly the assumption that ‘staked-tokens’ owners have incentive to act in the network’s interest (they actually do not, since dominant holders 20% accrue more investment in the network’s success than other having 1% less holdings staked, regardless of the actual stake size). PoA algorithm, instead of tokens as stake, takes participants’ identity as stake, thus implying the disclosure of validators as known entities risking their reputations for the right to validate the blocks. Thus, unlike in PoS, monetary discrepancies between validators are irrelevant, ensuring equal motivation to work for network success. Regarding DeFi token trades, the specification of ERCs depends, among other relevant factors, on the content of the rights associated or incorporated to the cryptos. And such rights granted to the token holder or acquirer previously depend on the mechanism or mode of representation of digital assets involved in the standard. In the case of NFTs, one of the key characteristics of the rights associated with the token is non-fungibility which implies the full identification of the token, its individuation, plus the limitation to massive trade whenever the token is unique and there is no prevision for massive token trade-off on a DLT market platform. In a PDL-Ethereum context, different protocols generating different types of ERCs constitute an ideal and flexible way for the orderly management of the corresponding transactions on tokens and associated smart contracts to efficiently execute trades. The structure of such trading varies considering the NFT intrinsic structure and tradability as an investment token. It is to be noted that the first characteristic of the NFT to consider to this extent is the market tradability of the crypto. Some NFTs could be traded despite they are technically (apart from its referred or underlying asset) non-fungible or unique, since massive tradability could be obtained by means of fractioning or by means of contractual linking or connections to tradable assets or rights constituted on such massively tradable assets in regular or specific DeFi markets, which should be regulated. Deputy members of EU Parliament (MEPs) and EU INATBA (International Association for Trusted Blockchain Application), representing DLT industries, have been suggesting according considerations within the MiCA Task Force Working Groups created to feedback MEPs with relevant criteria from DLT industry and PDLs. Spain’s DLT Alastria Consortium (cofounded by Prof. J. IBÁÑEZ) is a founding member of INATBA, thus participating since 2021 in finance WGs operating in INATBA MiCA Task Force (cf. https://inatba.org/mica-task-force/). Proof of Authority (PoA) blockchain protocols, within this context, may play a key role to determine the consent of public supervisors in order to authorize the legal trading of NFTs in the scope and within the boundaries predetermined by the securities markets applicable rules. The reputation of validators is held by market authorities, which makes PoA impractical for public blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum, wherein hundreds or even thousands of validating nodes operative, and the identity requirement becomes a clear advantage to comply with regulations in the context of public-permissioned blockchains subject to legal specific requirements. In a PoA-network PPDL, a relatively small number of validating nodes re-centralize or make the market less decentralized, facilitating supervision, with enough degree of decentralization but gaining in investor and market confidence (like in the cases of Hyperledger Besu networks, an implementation of Enterprise Ethereum offering two PoA alternatives; or in the Alastria Consortium Telsius and Besu networks), with much higher throughput capacity than in permissionless blockchains, minimal computational effort and no specialized equipment (like in PoS). The acceptation of established financial institutions (as investment banks, financial intermediaries, or crypto-asset service new providers) as validators for crypto-transactions should be a legal previous condition to the settlement of DeFi market platforms for cryptos. Previous authorization of intermediaries in traditional financial markets is essential to the market confidence and investor protection. Similarly, previous authorization of validating nodes in crypto-transactions will probably be a legal and also economic-efficient precondition for the development of token transactions in general, and in particular for high-risk token investments like NFT trading. Although PoA-based algorithms are unlikely to power big market platforms with thousands or millions of users, they are already optimal to build networks tailored to the needs of a limited number of known stakeholders (agreeing, [4]), as in the case of certain limited-client oriented NFT platforms and markets. 4. Approach to the legal and economic consequences of NFT trading in PDLs. Particular reference to public-permissioned networks (PPDLs) DLT, in its blockchain version, facilitates the creation of markets built on decentralized applications (DApps) and platforms wherein token marketplaces can be installed and open to the public for the online confluence of investors seeking high returns operating from any blockchain-associated (operating or regular) node, directly or through representatives—cryptoasset or cryptotoken brokers or market specialists. As mentioned supra (section 2), in PPDL blockchain networks like Ethereum, token transactions use to be executed using specific protocols of permissioning like PoA. In the case of NFTs, each token is autonomous, identifiable in the ledger and separable to be examined for efficient traceability and proper exercise of holders’ rights. Its API interface, available on the upper layer of a PDL network architecture, facilitates traffic and exchange of tokens in accordance with market legal requirements and economic constraints of the business model settled by the issuer, with no quantitative boundaries within the issuing process, as a consequence of the PDL structure of protocols. Frequently, the ERC 20 protocol is used in PDL Ethereum networks to represent and transmit fungible assets (typically, of a financial nature, such as fixed or variable income products, and derivatives on these); while others such as ERC 721, the first in use chronologically, and also others of later construction, such as ERC 1155, are used to represent and assign or transfer rights over infungible cryptoassets like NFTs. The substantial content of the ERC 721 protocol is specified in a standard smart contract of Solidity, on whose original code the creators of open or free software (developers) can write lines or scripts of new smart contracts (Smart Contracts, SCs) or clauses compatible with the ERC 721 standard itself in order to adapt it to new uses, by means of transcription and import from a virtual library or code library called OpenZeppelin. The ERC 721 SC standard itself implements application programming interfaces (APIs) also designated as ERC 721 or, under certain conditions, APIs under another compatible protocol designated as ERC 165, which facilitate specific interaction between API and SC for traceability and transmission of NFTs on the PDL. Regardless of the PDL ledger registration of NFT transactions on blocks, each NFT is virtually maintained, possessed and (under private-law full compliance conditions present in each competent jurisdiction) owned virtually in digital wallets. The NFT may also be transferred individually to a singular purchaser, or eventually be traded by speculative investors or their authorized representatives from nodes, directly or through brokers or auctioneers specialized in operating with these wallets. Each NFT token can represent new born virtual or digital non-fungible individualized assets such as artistic or ludic representations (like the famous recreational “cryptokitties” from Axiom ZEN, coded in 2017 to ERC 721 and identified by their respective unique set of “genes” of appearance, passable onto offspring by “breeding” with one another; or the 2021 Bored Ape Yatch Club –BAYC- pics and drawings); preexisting goods or physical assets (art works or linked intellectual property of authors – IP); specific commodities; individuated or isolated credit rights on any asset, e.g., music fragments; or even offline services. The referred or underlying asset, financial (credits) or nonfinancial, will normally be non-fungible, and such non-fungibility justifies the issuance of such kind of token. But since the token individuation is independent from the degree of fungibility of the physical underlying (property, work of art, collectibles, . ), NFT can be issued on groups of fungible assets functioning unitarily or characterized by convention with unicity, or on identified parts of such fungible assets, parts, or fractions of them. Thus, a PDL platform manager or DApp programmer (NFT issuer or not) can also create and involve the trading of rights over prefigured new financial assets derived from the NFT, or on the NFT itself, or create guarantee contracts or other kind of guarantees or akin securities also recordable on the ledger, and offchain as well. PDLs permit the negotiation of an unlimited number of NFTs, as was already the case of the ERC 20 fungible token standard created in 2016, from which NFT-suitable ERC 721 itself derives, unlike the Bitcoin system where the cryptocurrency resulting from the mining or composition of transactions is quantitatively limited. Ethereum PDLs have also enlighten the factual NFT-trading utility of other ERC protocols like the ERC 1155 standard, generated in 2017 and officially deployed in permissioned systems since 2019. This much more evolved ERC, wherein a record number of developers have participated, allows the issuance of both fungible tokens and NFTs, all of them under a more flexible smart contract modality (SC ), unlike the precedent ERC 20 and 721, which require a new SC per token. Under ERC 1155, the investor or broker uses a secure interface and the SC allows to adapt a menu of unique features, such as, in the case of war games, different weapons, defense modes, or battle scenarios; if they are connected to a metaverse, it is possible to introduce unique parameters and conditions by NFT, and similarly individualized replicas from the real world. On the other hand, the ERC 1155 standard makes it easy to send multiple tokens in a single block transaction (even more than a thousand), shortening the wait for block closures and therefore increasing the speed of DeFi operations. Likewise, this standard allows the exchange of tokens in a safe and disintermediated way, enhancing the construction of atomized financial products (e.g., “atomic” derivatives like swaps and other). In summary, each NFT token can relvolve around fungible or non-fungible goods or rights, irrespective of its own non-fungibility or full individuation as a stand-alone asset, that prevents its massive or impersonal exchangeability that exempts its issuance from primary-market public or administrative control applicable to MiFID, MiCA DLT, or DeFi regulated trading (cf. again art. 4 MiCA). Regardless of the concurrence and level of legal control of token issuances, it should be borne in mind that, in any virtual space of a DeFi platform on the upper DApp (decentralized application) layer of a PDL network, a permissioned (previously authorized) mechanism for representing the rights of the parties contracting NFTs is always created. Such authorization is made under private-law boundaries. Smart contracts (SCs) required to execute NFT contracts are also previously authorized and deployed on the service layer of the PDL. And before SC authorization, PDL PoA or similar protocol to execute transactions has been implemented. Such chain of permissions is prior to the provision of investment or exchange services for NFTs, within a PDL context. The NFT contract for the transfer of the underlying property or connected services or investment is concluded autonomously, prior to the technical (and legal) birth of the token. In the case of NFT tokenization or invest in nft minting of nonexpendable property or rights (for example, real estate, art, or copyright), the ERC standard allows for the subdivision, not of the tokenized sole or indivisible property, but of a representation of property ( in rem ) rights or credit rights of investors in a public offer made by an offeror, against the issuer of the tokens, which may or may not be that offeror. In case of initial token offering (ITO), the rights have been “fungibilized,” which does not imply a reconversion of the non-fungible asset into a fungible one, but rather a substitution or a subdivision or fractioning of the object of investment to allow massive or market negotiation. In the case of real estate tokenization, for example, virtual fungible goods (real estate tokens) are created to represent credit rights on properties that can be registered using Ethereum ERC 20 tokens, or to provide an alternative for the transmission of full or limited real rights. We have emphasized [5] [132, 218–221] that the token fungibility does not impede the existence in the real world of the tokenized represented underlying assets (services or goods) nor the possibility of contracting on it also in the real world. The link between an NFT and the real asset through annotations in a public registry privileges and prioritizes the legal position of the token holder to the point of “establishing it as a means of representation deserving of a regime analogous to that of negotiable securities (including nonfinancial assets such as listed merchandise), for the purposes of recognition of ownership transferred in a market” – ibidem. Summarizing, PDL networks, in particular public-permissioned DLT networks like Alastria’s, facilitate the legal compliance with private-law contractual issues related to the identification of NFTs and their underlying asset or property, and also with public-law issues concerning the supervision of node protocols and activity in contract registration and authorization of DeFi platform managers and issuers. Hereinafter, we deal with particular conditions of compliance that challenge the NFT trading activity in such DLT permissioned spaces. 5. Specific law-compliant trading challenges for NFTs. Without intention to explain all legal problems related with NFT commerce, we hereinafter show some of the key issues posed by NFT market practice in PDL DeFi environments considering basic differences among common law and civil law jurisdictions, and between negotiable (massively traded in market places) and non-traded tokens. 5.1 The nature of the token and its underlying good and the legal regime applicable to NFT trading. First of all, it is to be outlined that tokenization has different legal consequences and scope in the case of NFT trading and in the one of fungible virtual assets. But the bunch of law-compliance specialties widens when taking into account the nature of the goods, services, or assets underlying the NFT. In the case of listed deliverable goods, like agricultural products quoted in commodity exchanges, NFTs can confer rights to the possession, transfer, disposal, withdrawal, or delivery of goods previously identified (e.g., selected wine bottles, or containers, with trademark and specifications of quality and provenance from a denomination of origin guaranteeing such characteristics) in favor of the token holder. The same structure would be applicable to collectable or individualized artworks or cataloged antiquities. The nature and extension of faculties granted by the token can differ substantially in the case of NFT unlisted goods, as the corresponding administrative or public-law regimes applicable to their registration vary depending on the civil-law regimes or common law principles for the delivery and efficacy of the transmission of property, and according to the nature of the tokenized object and specialties of its delivery and transmission. The NFT negotiable tokens, or alternative fungible tradable tokens on which “derivative” rights on NFTs or underlying physical assets are created, require the implementation of regimes such as the one provided for in MiCA for their legal circulation as investment tokens, with specific supervision and provision of services efficiently supplied by professional intermediaries of blockchain services (virtual asset service providers – VASPs or crypto asset service providers – CASPs). In civil law countries, legislators usually adopts Roman law antecedents to consider that the cession of any property, including rights annotated or recorded in a public registry of properties (mostly for real state but also for mobile financial property), requires, for legal efficacy of the transmission in favor of the acquiring party or purchaser, the compliance of registration standard principles like legitimacy. In most countries, transferor shall be deemed to remain the holder of the token until the name of the transferee is entered in the ledger or the token is received in the digital wallet of the purchaser. Otherwise, most EU jurisdictions under MiFID domain set regimes on mobile fungible assets (namely listed assets) establishing specific rules of control and recognition of fungibility in order to effectively protect the position of both the registry (in terms of public trust) and the registered holders of traded assets. Thus, concepts like “tradability of securities” as noted in art. 18 of Spain’s Decree 878/2015 developing national securities law (art. 6.4 Ley del Mercado de Valores) defines the “fungibility” of the book-entry securities associating it with the equality or identity of “characteristics” of the book-entry. The grouping of the property of the fungible securities in “balances” or “determined amounts” identified in the account of the holder, as in the case of classes and series of securities issued by the same company, demonstrates the capability of fungible assets for massive trading, without prejudice to “the needs of specification or breakdown of registered securities derived from special situations” (art. 18.3, ibid.) such as embargo, execution of sentences or usufruct contracts, modification of encumbrances, or other relevant circumstances that do not affect the identity of the characteristics among the fungible values but can be registered (as in the case of the pledge, whose registration is equivalent to possessory displacement of the recorded value, ex art 14.1 Decree 878/2015). Similarly, special regimes could consider NFT as eligible negotiable assets grouped in such amounts within segregated accounts to protect the rights of holders at the same level of fungible securities under the aforementioned circumstances, applying similar rules considering the singularities of NFT identity or individuation as a key characteristic for the autonomous recognition of the virtual asset as a category of DeFi tradable (and ledger-traceable) security. The non-fungible characterization of NFTs, in a PDL network, and more specifically in the realm of the PPDL, can become preconfigured and programmed by the platform managers and by DApp/SC developers (with the acquiescence and participation of the issuer in the process) from the very beginning of the preparation of the platform in accordance with the PoA consensus protocol, and in any case they must be set to prepare the transfer of the cryptos no later than the start-up of the SCs layer and the contemporary provision and insertion of the tokens in the platform. In particular, in accordance with the specifications of the ERC requests for comments for the case of Ethereum network protocols and derivatives (for example, those of the Quorum-Ethereum kind). 5.2 Investment and betting with NFTs. All investments entail a bet in the sense of probability of nonreturn, partial, or total loss of committed funds, or materialization of the fundamental economic risks of price, market, and solvency of the issuer, in addition to operational, network resilience, and regulatory risks. On the other hand, not every rational investment involves a bet in the classic sense of “game,” limited or even prohibited according to civil law private regimes (e.g., Spanish civil code of 1889, arts. 1790 and 1801). Both ethical and social reasons, and the reasonableness of NFT trading control from a public order perspective and from the viewpoint of investor protection, should prevail in future specific NFT regulations. The magnitude of the interests potentially affected, also in the strict legal-private sphere, is exponentially growing in the case of the NFTs market. Thus, investments could require betting or gambling legal boundaries in the purest sense of market speculation. Surveillance should foresee the measurement of NFT returns and the consistency and soundness of their value and valuation methods, still in infancy and precarious, since the bul of the NFT investment value depends on unknown factors such as the issuer credit risk, the fulfilment of contractual promises of profitability, or the effective avoidance of cyber risks incorporated into the architecture of the PDL network wherein the transfer of tokens takes place. Even the risks associated with the potential misuse of protocols or abuse of technical trading platform should be considered when legally qualifying NFT trading as gambling in this particular context. However, this does not exclude their generic character of “investments,” and therefore, to the extent that investment contracts are made in the market, they must be subject to a specific regime, which many issuers seek to avoid by selecting unregulated DeFi trading forums and movements of headquarters or establishment of the platform and the underlying business (forum shopping), triggering overall risks borne by unaware investors, as already denounced by the best mercantile-law doctrine regarding speculative stock market positions. Transactions made by virtual characters (avatars) proliferate exponentially (purchase of virtual yachts or virtual plot in a metaverse like Sandbox, created by Republic Realm Co.). The association between a metaverse and NFTs representing unrepeatable unusable objects (because they are unusable) is a symbol of elitism and selection of smart investment today. Decentraland, a “virtual local” of 560 m2 meters, was recently sold for 2.4 M USD in Mana cryptocurrency, located in the exclusive virtual street of Fashion Street, hosts fashion shows. Burberry, Gucci, Louis Vuitton, Adidas, and Nike (developing Nikeland metaverse) already operate in these virtual environments. Microsoft Teams video conferencing app, widely used in the professional and educational world, will soon allow Mesh to operate in the metaverse trading NFTs in virtual markets, creative form of a parallel financial system, but also of a mechanism of social separation, where operators develop systems possibly widening the digital social breach. This is why investment valuation must be redefined considering the difficulty of access to the market and use of sophisticated DeFi payment tools and NFT contracts by which a few investors gain stratospheric profits in the purest classic stock-market speculation on extra-volatile instruments. Aside from ethical-philosophical considerations, these economic facts should lead to legislative reflection on the creative value mechanisms of NFTs, even with a possible redesign of the legal concepts of “utility” in the Paretian sense, and “value,” since the emergence of new asset valuation models determining reactive mechanisms to protect the integrity of the market and the health of the financial system itself, aligned with the single European digital market and within the conceptual framework of the European digital finance strategy, led by the MiCA-IM-DORA proposed regulations. Measuring the value of NFTs on works of art in new NFT DeFi marketplaces connected on metaverses requires imagination and prompt reaction to volatility. Investment caprice, artistic novelty, or simply the sudden mobilization of large investments, in the absence of institutional market creation systems or control mechanisms such as the DeFi AMM, restrict a rational control of volatility. Classic CFROI-type valuation systems, and even other more accurately adjusted to market valuation like value-at-risk (VAR) or real-option methods, are practically useless in these virtual contexts, considering their geographic offshoring, their lack of jurisdictional control (and even competent jurisdiction), and the dilution of responsibilities associated with the use of DLT and linked digital technologies, whose scope does not seem difficult to intuit, despite their yet unknown full dimension. The role of national and regional regulators on NFT volatility control mechanisms is crucial for financial stability even when such tokens represent unique creations and cannot be legally reputed ARTs or present extreme valuation complexity according to traditional parameters. The existence of a stable reference underlying currency or asset to establish a correspondence or value relationship, as in the case of electronic money tokens or EMTs and those referenced to assets or ARTs, as contemplated by the MiCA regulation. Setting up legal support, like endorsement guarantee or reserve system and mandatory coefficients specific for NFT risk hedging or coverage, associated with the value relationship or correspondence system, including collateral execution and reserve governance mechanisms, among others, to limit credit and insolvency risk of issuers and ensure the execution of investment contracts on the tokens. Minimal state prudential supervision ensuring DeFi NFT market compliance and regulatory updating, including proper monitoring of the actions of operators for the sake of market integrity, financial stability, and investor protection, especially in cases of high pre-contractual informative asymmetry or disinformation of holders. 5.3 Considerations related to specific primary-market obligations of NFT direct or derivative. As outlined before, MiCA does not regulate NFTs, apart from the exemption rule excluding them from the MiCA whitepaper regime. The EU regulator assumes that NFTs are “unique” (individuated) and also presumes that the token is not related to other cryptos. But in the case of existing a predetermined contractual relationship between the NFT and the represented object, either in form of economic indexing or stabilization arrangement, or in form of contractual commitment (i.e., servicing, lending, or fund depositing) with respect to underlying assets (like in asset-referenced tokens – ARTs), the MiCA primary-market whitepaper transparency rules on construction, notification, and legal publication would be applicable to issuers. Even if that were not the case, NFT issuing entities would be anyway constrained, under MiCA EU provisions, by the general obligations applicable to crypto-asset issuers or petitioners of admission to trading in authorized DeFi platforms, when the tokens are not stablecoins (e-money—EMT—or asset-referenced—ART—cryptos; when issuing ARTs or EMTs, issuance obligations intensify to protect investor, market stability, and monetary local or national policy). But all MiCA-ruled tokens are cryptoassets requiring adequate investor protection standards in all jurisdictions. Some authors do not qualify tokens other stablecoins as crypto-assets in the sense of MiCA regime— per omnia , [6], arguing that EU regulation is designed to prioritize the supervision of stablecoins (AMTs/EMTs), thus excluding other cryptos. It is true that stablecoins are monitored with particular intensity, but encompassing most crypto-tokens present in markets (including NFTs under particular circumstances) is a key aim of the MiCA legislator as well. Acting honestly, impartially, and with professionally in the best interest of token holders, treating them fairly except in case of due preferential treatment as shown in whitepaper provisions and publicity or commercial communications. Impartial, prompt, relevant, complete, and not misleading or deceitful communication with token holders. Detection, prevention, and management of all conflict of interest arisen, which should be communicated to interested parties. Safekeeping and maintenance of all access systems and protocols in accordance with EU pertinent standards specified by the European Securities Market Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Banking Authority (ABE) ex art. 16 of UE Regulation 1095/2010. Timely reimbursement of funds deposited by token holders or possible investors; in cases of cancellation of an initial public offering of tokens (ITO) for any reason (cf. par. 3 of article 13 MiCA), ensuring due immediate payment by themselves or by fund custodians, depositary banks, or escrow agents. 5.4 Essential intellectual property (IP) protection issues. NFTs can represent, in the case of author artistic or scientific underlying creation, IP rights. Such intellectual work can adopt the form of virtually accessible videos, pics, graphics, lines, drawings, or artistic elements contained in the token or associated to it. The NFT can be created ad hoc to be linked to the PDL transaction containing and thereafter, recording the NFT data. The NFT is virtually possessed in the wallet of token holders who pay for it in the DeFi market. In other cases, NFTs do not represent virtual artworks but preexisting assets (e.g., songs, movie images or paintings on canvas) on which authors or coauthors have also moral and economic IP rights. In many cases, authors retain copyright and token buyers just acquire rights of use as licensees, having faculties of loading, visualizing, or sharing images or objects accessible by possessing the token in a digital wallet. Such noncommercial rights should be clearly communicated in marketing channels and in clear licensing terms and conditions as well in order to prevent future claims derived from insufficient or inadequate pre-contractual information, as recent US doctrine spotlights [7]. NFT trading facilitates the sale of works, either selling the whole value of IP economic rights or parts of it in case of high-value artistic unique pieces. But it is to be well noted that these tokens representing IP rights do no generate themselves a proof of authorship. To this extent, it is necessary to reflect on the circumstance of the previous generation of the authorship, always preceding the constitution of the token as a virtual support on the PDL. DeFi NFT marketplaces usually present and show determined cryptographic elements containing or representing IP rights. These elements are sold by means of DLT transactions but were previously created by authors. Buying and selling of IP, from a legal perspective, can be executed by means of DLT transactions meaning the effective purchase and sale of those works. The sale means the virtual traditio (delivery for the cession of property) of the IP rights, from the moment in which the transaction is recorded in the ledger. The generation of proofs of authorship needs, therefore, to be prior to the sale, or circulation, of any artwork. But the risk of distributed (DLT) use of digital work (or work in general) by unauthorized persons (misappropriation, IP usurpation) is permanent. Professional scammers or IP usurpers utilize virtually supported or mounted artwork and upload artworks to the blockchain as their own, creating the representation (NFTs minting) from previous art represented that they did not compose or fabricate. This is one of the main perils around NFTs and even around blockchain PDLs in general. Unscrupulous NFT creators pretend to be art composers of works they do not have even permission to distribute or exhibit, creating derivative works of original works and selling them without the author's consent or even knowledge. Additional phishing, impersonation, identity fraud or theft, and unfulfilled promises of NFT distribution or delivery are common disloyal additional practices tied to these shadow markets. The activity of NFT minting of digital assets including IP (artwork, music, video clips, . ) or industrial property (trademarks, patents) by persons other than authors, owners, or valid licensees are liable for infringing third-party IP, and cannot grant to the token purchasers such rights either since they do not have them (nemo plus iura transferre potest quam ipse haberet). Misstating the rights conveyed in connection with the NFT sale entails possible additional claims against token minters and DeFi platforms involved in such sales. Specific legal recognition of NFT transactions in PDLs, including virtual IP transmission, as cession of IP rights as regulated in IP laws currently in force in each competent jurisdiction. Specific legal recognition and regulation of platforms wherein such rights are granted or transmitted, in order to avoid civil liability of platform and DApp managers where NFTs infringing IP are being traded, even without acquaintance or even knowledge of those administrators. Since most NFTs have a single owner, they are not likely to be securities but, as shown before, in some cases they may; in the US, if they meet the Howey test, for the token buyer invests with a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the efforts of others. And in the EU under MiFID rules, when NFTs are listed in regular markets as financial instruments (e.g., in case of pooling or division of credit rights, securitized in liquid markets). The creation of specific public registries encompassing DLT IP represented by NFTs concerning virtual or material artworks or creations. Alternatively, the constitution of sections for virtual properties in the existing registries, in order to properly cope with the peculiarities of NFT-related IP conflicts. Collective social reflection led by market authorities and IP competent public institutions and registries, in order to instruct virtual artwork professional authors, particularly on the economic relevance of legal artwork registration, in order to foment the generation of early proof of authorship, and thus effectively defend both original underlying IP rights, and token-associated IP as well. Facilitation by PDL administrators, in cases of fraud, of a ledger proof of fraudulent transactions or scams on tokens, in favor of prejudiced authors. If an NFT contains robbed, plagiarized, or forged IP, transactions also reflect such infraction, and PDL managers can help locate and consult the concerned transaction in the network. Ruling on market disclaimers warning potential NFT buyers on the fact that (in most cases) the only property they are acquiring is just a unique trace recorded in the ledger, containing a link to images of an artwork. NFTs detail transaction data (selling date, price, contracting parties’ public-key addresses, wallet identifiers, . ). but they do not specify what has been bought or sold. Ruling on the minimum mandatory contents of the NFT regime, with detail of the exploitation rights associated to the holding of the crypto, and the way to exercise such rights. Like in securities legal theory, NFT can lack, like traditional negotiable titles of credit, literality, and not refer to the full content of rights to be exerted by the holder. Anyway, the DeFi platform or NFT market managers should document such and register such contents (off the NFT, off-chain at least; e.g., by recording in Interplanetary File System IPFS with link to the crypto) to fully inform investors or purchasers of tokens. Otherwise, these might soon become empty properties. Immutable and inseparable linking between IPFS info and NFT impedes a new creation of NFT containing its copyright data previously registered in an authorized or private DeFi DApp or platform, as practitioners resourcefully indicate [8]. 5.5 Miscellaneous public-law compliance issues. Market illegal practices have been detected in recent years concerning the misuse and abuse of crypto-assets, particularly utility tokens and high value NFTs, as money-laundering vehicles. European authority (ESMA) and the U.S. Department of the Treasury have published recent studies on the facilitation of money laundering and terrorist financing through the NFT and stablecoin trade in ARTs. In the case of NFTs, digital art is involved as a relatively easy instrument for capital laundering, considering the volatility of art assets, which is extreme in the case of high-value art pieces, vulnerable to financial crimes. In the realm of the administrative control of gambling, players pay for a chance to win betting on an NFT position traded on a secondary market. Such position may be deemed a “thing of value” potentially implicating gambling issues. The increased use of chance-based mechanics in games (e.g., lootboxes, casino games) has led to enhanced scrutiny under gambling mandatory laws and to class-action lawsuits. Many game publishers have prevailed those lawsuits filed against them when terms of service grant only a license to use an in-game currency or items in the game and prohibit their transfer or exchange. Such currencies and items have no value for gambling law purposes, but NFTs issued or promoted by gambling companies create true tradable cryptoasset in DeFi markets. That is why DLT-based games use few chance-based mechanics and more play-to-earn or user-generated content models. Finally, other public-law related issues deal with market abuse. Within this scope, NFT insider trading policies should be completed and updated by NFT massive professional issuers and by DeFi marketplaces and brokers trading with NFT. Recent incidents of directors, top-level employees, and executives at NFT companies and marketplaces outline the need of engaging in specific preventive self-regulatory activity. NFT insider trading policies should restrict, condition, or even prohibit the intermediation, purchase, or sale of NFTs based on publicly reserved or undisclosed information, also prohibiting various types of token market manipulation (including underlying markets) by whistleblowing or manipulating the optimal prices by means of company NFT trades designed to distort the perceived price level or the trading volumes. 6. Conclusion. NFTs pose huge market and legal challenges, which should be guided by legislators with full respect to technological neutrality and entrepreneurial innovation initiative in PPDL emerging networks. Fungibility is a legal-economic concept concerning tokens and their underlying assets. Forthcoming NFT regimes still dismiss this dichotomy and its relevance for the right insertion of tokens in legal taxonomies entailing the applicability of securities-law requirements (like EU MiFID2 primary-market rules) or crypto-asset specific laws (like MiCA Regulation), and their further developments concerning NFT ownership and transferability of rights tied to their exchange in DeFi platforms. In the field of IP, effective protection of NFT purchasers demands additional efforts to balance the interests of DLT-platform managers and DApp industry with adequate protection of IP rights and authors of digital art. Such balance is necessary too for effective protection of investors and purchasers of rights linked to NFTs in the cases of gambling, money-laundering and macro-financial instability involving in DeFi NFT illicit trading. PPDL architecture surveillance is an excellent vehicle to this extent, requiring bespoke intervention in node governance, both on and off chain. References. 1. European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL), Application Scenarios. Available from: http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gr/PDL/001_099/003/01.01.01_60/gr_PDL003v010101p.pdf [Accessed: March 27, 2022] 2. Wang C et al. An Introduction of Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL). ETSI White Paper No. #48. Sophia Antipolis CEDEX; 2022. pp. 1-12 3. Ibáñez J. Consorcio Red Alastria. Madrid: Reus; 2020. p. 280 4. Bogdanov D. Proof of Authority Explained. LimeChain blog. Available from: https://limechain.tech/blog/. [Accessed: February 21, 2022] 5. Ibáñez J. Tokens valor (Security tokens). Madrid: Reus; 2021. p. 402 6. Muñoz Pérez AF. Algunas consideraciones sobre la taxonomía de criptoactivos en el regimen de transparencia. In: Ibáñez J, editor. Transformación digital y nueva regulación de personas, instituciones y mercados –Estudios Jurídicos en Homenaje al Profesor Prades Cutillas. Madrid: Reus; 2022 7. Gatto J, Parsafar Y, Koury G, Almasi P. Tokenization and the Law: Legal Issues with NFTs, The National Law Review, vol. XII, Nr. 131. Available from: https://www.natlawreview.com/article/tokenization-and-law-legal-issues-nfts#:~:text=AnNFTcanbesubjectfromtheeffortsofothers. [Accessed: April 30, 2022] 8. Iglesias A. NFT y propiedad intelectual: cómo se articula la protección de los derechos de los autores en la era del ‘blockchain’. Invertia-El Español, blog; 2021. Available from: https://www.elespanol.com/invertia/ disruptores-innovadores/politica-digital/espana/20211108/nft-propiedad-intele ctual-articula-proteccion-derechos-blockchain/624938006_0.html. [Accessed: May 11, 2022] Sections. 1. Introduction 2. The private-law characterization and EU regime applicable to non-fungible tokens (NFTs) 3. A brief introduction to permissioning in blockchain and to public-permissioned distributed ledgers or networks (PPDLs) and its relevance for NFT contracting and markets 4. Approach to the legal and economic consequences of NFT trading in PDLs. Particular reference to public-permissioned networks (PPDLs) 5. Specific law-compliant trading challenges for NFTs 6. Conclusion.

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