



浙江大学计算机学院
数字媒体与网络技术

Digital Asset Management

数字媒体资源管理

4. Digital Rights Management



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About homework-02

Digital Rights Management Revisit

- DRM and movie industry: DVD CSS
- DRM and music industry:
 - audio CD: from sony BMG
 - internet music: iTunes store
- E-Books: Adobe Acrobat, M\$ Reader, Kindle



- permission
- restriction
- obligation

Rights

own

over



- rights holder
- end customer

User


create/use



Content

DRM basic Model

DRM Reference Architecture





- 守护数字文档,数字版权管理:一个商业难题 [新华网 2006年7月7日]
 - 在国内某著名兵工厂的一次老总级别会议后,一份电子版的会议纪要被秘密地发送到了几个有权限的重要人物手中,三个小时之后,这份文件将会自动销毁.
- 一个商业难题
- 新销售体系
- 待填补的市场

Thus, we see ...

- **DRM** can help ensure companies, corporations, and other entities who share similar business that:
 - Rights are tracked at ingestion
 - Access is controlled during production processes
 - Protection for the content extends throughout product life-cycles

Thus, we see ...

- Additionally, **DRM** can integrate persistent content protection with content management to ensure:
 - Proper business practices
 - Implementation of new business models
 - Compliance with regulatory requirements in industries such as financial services, healthcare, and government




- 首批广播影视数字版权管理标准完成起草

- <http://news.cctv.com/china/20081108/105830.shtml>
- <http://space.tv.cctv.com/video/VIDE1226188087000110>

Previous Technologies

- PKI – Public Key Infrastructure
- PGP – Pretty Good Privacy
- S/MIME
- Access Control Systems
- Smart Cards
- Biometrics



How are these technologies **different** to DRM?

- Only protect the data in transit
 - E.g. over the Internet or on CD
- Once the data is opened, it can be:
 - edited
 - copied
 - printed
 - saved as an unprotected file

And then

- Redistributed to anyone else in an unprotected format.

Rely on TRUST once the content is delivered



Protecting Digital Intellectual Property

- Preventing Copying with Encryption
 - 加密
- Preventing Copying with Watermarking
 - 水印

Preventing Copying With Encryption (加密)

- Encryption is the scrambling of a message
 - Simple one is Caesar encryption
 - To decrypt (decode) message, you need one or more *Keys*
 - Also need an encryption *algorithm*, that specifies how to apply the key to the message to produce the scrambled message
- Symmetric key crypto: same key used for encrypt/decrypt
- Public key (we'll talk about the details later...):
 - Keys come in matched pairs: one encrypts, other decrypts
 - Given one key, you cannot deduce the other




Encryption

- RSA
- DES
- MD5


MD5

(Message Digest Algorithm version 5)

- MD5 is widely used in the open source world
- Enough for data sharing
- But not so safe




MD5 算法



- 输入：以512位分组来处理的信息
 - 每一分组又被划分为16个32位子分组
 - 对信息进行填充，使其位长对512求余的结果等于448
 - $N \times 64 + 56$ 个字节
- 输出：四个32位分组，构成128位散列
 - Hashing：散列

MD5算法



- Chaining Variable
 - $A=0x01234567$, $B=0x89abcdef$,
 $C=0xfedcba98$, $D=0x76543210$
- 循环运算
 - A到a, B到b, C到c, D到d
 - 主循环有四轮
 - 一轮进行16次操作
 - 每次操作对a、b、c和d中的其中三个作一次非线性函数运算

MD5 算法

- 基本函数

- $F(X,Y,Z) = (X \& Y) | ((\sim X) \& Z)$
- $G(X,Y,Z) = (X \& Z) | (Y \& (\sim Z))$
- $H(X,Y,Z) = X \wedge Y \wedge Z$
- $I(X,Y,Z) = Y \wedge (X | (\sim Z))$
- & 表示“与”，|表示“或”，
~表示“非”，^表示“异或”

- 基本操作

- $FF(a, b, c, d, M_j, s, t_i)$
 $a = b + ((a + F(b, c, d) + M_j + t_i) \ll s)$
- $GG(a, b, c, d, M_j, s, t_i)$
 $a = b + ((a + G(b, c, d) + M_j + t_i) \ll s)$
- $HH(a, b, c, d, M_j, s, t_i)$
 $a = b + ((a + H(b, c, d) + M_j + t_i) \ll s)$
- $II(a, b, c, d, M_j, s, t_i)$
 $a = b + ((a + I(b, c, d) + M_j + t_i) \ll s)$
- M_j 表示消息的第j个子分组（从0到15）


MD5算法

- 在第*i*步中， t_i 是 $4294967296 * \text{abs}(\sin(i))$ 的整数部分，*i*的单位是弧度。
- 完成上述64步操作之后，将A、B、C、D分别加上a、b、c、d。然后用下一分组数据继续运行算法
- 最后的输出是A、B、C和D的级联。
- 例：（可试用python中的md5实现：hashlib）
 - MD5 ("") = d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
 - MD5 ("abc") = 900150983cd24fb0d6963f7d28e17f72

开源密码体系的崩溃

- 山东大学的王小云教授
 - [Crypto 2004], 利用hash碰撞原理, 攻破MD5、HAVAL-128、MD4和RIPEMD算法
 - 2005年8月, 给出攻击SHA - 1的算法

Basic Idea of Cryptography



Think of encryption key as sealing an envelope, and decryption key as unsealing it.



How do you “break” encryption?

- Usual assumptions of cryptography...
 - Adversary knows details of algorithm (not in WWII!)
 - Adversary may know something about nature of messages (why would this help?)
 - Adversary *doesn't know decryption key(s)*
- Hard: exploit mathematical weakness in the algorithm
- Hard: guess key by (educated) trial and error
- Usually easier: attack some weaker part of the system
 - Usually, trick system into revealing a key
 - Chain is only as strong as weakest link!



DVD Content Scrambling System (CSS)



- To each **licensed DVD player** corresponds a **decryption key**:
 - P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n
- Each disc is encrypted under its own key, call it D
 - n copies of D are stored on the disc; each copy encrypted with one player's P
 - Player finds a D that it can decrypt, then uses D to play disc
- DVD player is a trusted client
 - It's not supposed to ever reveal any D , or its own P
 - What happens if either of these occur?
 - Why can't you convert DVD to another format?
 - Why can't you make direct copies of a DVD onto another disc (copying the D keys along with the content?)

Early DeCSS timeline...



- Sep '99, DeCSS released as open-source Linux DVD player
- Dec '99, DVDCCA sues 500 individuals in California for hosting DeCSS, alleging trade-secret violations
- Jan '00, MPAA sues 2600.com in New York under DMCA's copyright protection circumvention laws
- Jan '00, DVD Source Code Distribution Contest
- Jan '00 Jon Johansen arrested in Norway, later released
- Aug 00 MPAA wins DMCA suit in NYC




How Was CSS cracked?

- Idea =>
- P must appear somewhere in the decryption code of a trusted player
 - Hardware players difficult to reverse-engineer/probe
 - Software players maybe easier? ...turns out yes!
 - Later analysis revealed weaknesses in CSS...it probably could have been broken *without* first recovering a key
- Original goal of CSS: even if one P is compromised, others are still sound
- Flaw: weakness in the algorithm allowed *all* P's to be compromised once a single P was found
 - Why wasn't this flaw discovered *before* the algorithm went into production players?




Preventing Copying With Watermarking (水印)

- digital art
- 票据防伪
- 数据隐藏
- 隐蔽通讯



Stenography



1. removing all but the last 2 bits of
each color component
2.X 85

Digital Watermark

- Invisible ink on multimedia data
 - image
 - video
 - music
 - graphics

Digital Watermark

- Image






Image watermarking




Embedding

Image watermarking



Detecting

DCT based algorithm



REF: <http://scien.stanford.edu/pages/labsite/200I/ee368/projects200I/dropbox/project06/>

Digital Watermark


- Music: mp3stego
<http://www.petitcolas.net/fabien/steganography/mp3stego/index.html>



Digital Rights Management – Rights Expression Language (REL)



Metadata for DRM



- MPEG-21: REL
- A digital item
 - is a structured digital object with a standard representation, identification and metadata
- User
 - is any entity that interacts in the MPEG-21 environment or makes use of digital items

Rights model

- Render rights
 - View, Print, Play or Execute
- Transport rights
 - Copy, Move, Loan
- Derivative work rights
 - Edit, Embed, Extract
- Utility rights
 - Backup, Caching, Data integrity



DRM technologies and associated devices

Name	Used in	Date to use	Description
Fairplay	ipod, iphone, itunes	2003+	The purchased music files are encoded as AAC, then encrypted with an additional format that renders the file exclusively compatible with iTunes and the iPod
3-play	Microsoft Zune	2006+	Music files that are received wirelessly from other Zune devices can be played only a maximum of three times on the device.
Janus WMA DRM	All PlaysForSure Devices	2004+	Janus is the codename for portable version of Windows Media DRM for portable devices.
OMA DRM	Implemented in over 550 phone models	2004+	A DRM system invented by the Open Mobile Alliance to control copying of cell phone ring tones

DRM opposition



**DRM IS
KILLING MUSIC**



AND IT'S A RIP OFF!

digital rights management
= digital restrictions management ?

DRM-free



- Apple began selling "DRM-Free" music through their iTunes store in April of 2007
- the DRM-Free iTunes files were still embedded with each user's account information

Digital Rights Expression Languages

- Rights may be managed using digital rights expression languages.
- DREs specify the permissions given to
 - users, distributors and repositories
 - and the conditions and obligations that have to be satisfied for these permissions to be exercised.



Rights Expression Language (REL)

- A standard way to express and interpret rights specification for interoperability.
- Comprehensive, generic, precise and extensible.
- eXtensible rights Markup Language (**XrML**).
 - XrML 2.0 : MPEG REL
- Open Digital Rights Language (**ODRL**).
 - ODRL 1.1 : OMA (Open Mobile Alliance) REL



General description of RELs

- A rights expression language (REL) is a type of policy authorization language.
 - Focus is on expressing rights granted by one party to another.
 - Issuance and delegation rights for other grants are core concepts.
 - Can be used to model lending, loans, transfers of rights.
- REL design goals:
 - Provide a flexible, extensible mechanism for expressing authorizations.
 - Enable interoperability across various policy evaluation systems.
 - Make it easy for policy authors (e.g. content owners) to express their desired policies.



An example REL: XrML 2.X

- XrML, the *XML Rights Management Language*, is a standard currently under development



XrML introduction

- The only REL in working DRM systems.
- Specification language:
 - Programmers specify high-level rights in a license file.
 - An XrML interpreter parses the license file.
 - REL SDK for building an XrML interpreter.
- Data model:
 - License, grant, principal, right, resource and condition



XrML license

License

Grant

**Principal
(Key-holder)**

Rights

Resource

Condition

Issuer

Signature

Time of Issuance



XrML 2.X

- In the RM context, XrML 2.X allows content owners a systematic way to express their intent for distribution and consumption.
- Like other policy languages, XrML 2.X **licenses** (statements) declare authorizations, but cannot enforce compliance.
 - Systems that consume XrML 2.X licenses must be trusted by the license issuer to properly enforce the grants specified within the license.
- Licenses are digitally signed by the issuer to protect their integrity.
- Licenses may be embedded within content or move independently.



Semantic of a Grant

- Every XrML 2.X grant has the following form:
 - Issuer authorizes principal to exercise a right with respect to a resource subject to conditions.
 - A license is a collection of one or more grants made by the same issuer.
- Grants may be **chained** together:
 - Bill's RM system trusts Tom and his delegates.
 - Tom delegates the right to license printing to John.
 - John issues a license: "Bill has the right to print the book."
 - Therefore Bill can print the book.



Sample XrML 2.X License

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<license>
  <grant>
    <keyHolder> ... </keyHolder>
    <mx:play />
    <mx:diReference>
      <mx:identifier>
        urn:mpeg:example:2002:twotonshoe:album
      </mx:identifier>
    </mx:diReference>
  </grant>
  <issuer> ... </issuer>
</license>
```



XrML authorization model

- Input
 - Principal
 - Right
 - Resource
 - Time interval
 - Licenses
 - Designated “root grants” (implicitly trusted)
- Output
 - “No”
 - “Yes,” unconditionally
 - “Maybe,” if a set of conditions are also met



XrML Key Language Features


- Mechanisms for enhanced expressivity
 - Patterns, variables and quantifiers
 - Grouping grants
 - Delegation
- Meta-rights
 - Issue
 - Obtain
 - Revocation
 - PossessProperty
- Linking conditions
 - PrerequisiteRight



MPEG-21 REL

- Derived from XrML
- 3 Components:
 - Kernel set
 - Standard extension
 - multimedia extension

structure of a simple license



Agenda

- Overview
- Introduction of DRM (Sony & DRM)
- Protecting Digital Intellectual Property
- Rights Expression Language (REL)
- Case Study – Existing DRM systems





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Case Studies



InterTrust

- Original DRM vendor (with IBM)
 - May have coined the term
 - Originally called Electronic Publishing Resources
 - First implementations in hardware
 - Major patent portfolio
- New technology: Rights|System
 - Framework for multiple devices
 - Rights|Desktop for PCs
 - Rights|TV for settop boxes
 - Rights|PDA for handheld devices
 - Rights|Phone for Symbian mobile phones
 - Public encryption algorithms



IBM EMMS

- Developed in IBM labs over period of 8 years
- Cross-device, like InterTrust
- Integration with IBM server components
 - WebSphere
 - DB2
 - Service Provider Delivery Environment (SPDE)



Microsoft

- 1st generation: Windows Media Player
- 2nd generation: Digital Asset Server
 - Server for Microsoft Reader E-Books
 - Uses subset of XrML
- 3rd generation: “Unified DRM” (RMS)
 - One DRM for all devices & platforms
 - Open API for rendering app developers
 - XrML based



MacroVision (1985-)

- Copy protection technique for VHS tapes
- Inserts special signals into the vertical blanking interval of NTSC protocol
 - affects automatic gain control in most VCRs, but is ignored by most televisions
 - difficult to remove from the original signal
- Makes subsequent recordings shake and have periods of bright and dark frames



Apple's FairPlay Technology



- DRM for iTunes
 - playing, recording, and sharing of files
- Moves beyond “protection only”
 - allows media to be shared among devices
 - allows others to listen to (but not copy) music
 - allows music to be burned to an audio CD, which loses the DRM protection

How FairPlay Works

- iTunes uses encrypted MP4 audio files
- Acquire decryption key by trying to play song
 - player generates a unique ID
 - sends this ID to the iTunes server
 - if there are less than N authorizations in your account, the server responds with decryption key
- The decryption key itself is encrypted so cannot be given to another machine



Discussion

- Is FairPlay too lenient, too stringent, or just about right?
- What is your experience with this DRM?
- What happens if Apple decides to stop supporting FairPlay?

